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  The idea behind this research project was to stimulate interest, dialogue, 
exploratory investigation, and the application of resources into the concept of an organic, 
rotary wing based, tanker asset for the U.S Navy’s Expeditionary Strike Group, and its 
future operations and role in support of Sea Power 21.  Material presented was gleaned 
from numerous aircraft flight manuals, program office documents, contractor literature, 
and the author’s experiences as a Fleet Marine Force CH-53E pilot.  Mission systems are 
presented using readily available equipment in untested configurations using proven 
tactics and historical experiences.  The results and conclusions make plain the need for an 
organic tanker asset to become part of the future of littoral warfare and the Navy’s vision 























All material within this document is Unclassified.  Specifications, capabilities, and 
characteristics of specific aircraft or equipment were obtained from aircraft flight 
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recommendations are presented as the opinions of this author and are not an official 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Aerial Refueling:  The refueling of an aircraft in flight by another aircraft. 
 
Air Refueling Control Point (ARCP):  The planned geographic point over which the 
receiver arrives in position with the assigned tanker. 
  
Blue Water operations:  Shipboard flight operations at sea in which a divert to land is 
unreachable, even with the use of a tanker. 
 
Milestone B:  Acquisition decision point to determine if results warrant establishing a 
new acquisition program. 
 
Pre-Planned Product Improvement:  Designed-in provision for future enhancement.  May 
require initial version to have excess capability to accommodate later enhancement. 
 
Pre-Contact Position:  A stabilized position three to five feet behind the aerial refueling 
drogue.  
 
Refueling Position:  A stabilized position behind the tanker that is maintained while 
taking on fuel. 
 
Spiral Development:  An iterative acquisition process in which a capability is identified 
but does not specify how the final system specifications will allow for growth and 
integration of new technologies. 
 
System Development and Demonstration:  An acquisition process to develop a system or 










The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is typically composed of U. S. Navy (USN) L- 
class ships, Figure 1, which embark a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and is deployed 
to various areas around the world.  The MEU is composed of two elements, a Ground 
Combat Element (GCE) and an Aviation Combat Element (ACE).  The MEU, by way of 
the ARG, is America’s rapid response force used to control situations that might develop 
in which the United States, or its allies, has a vested interest. For more than twenty years 
the ARG has embarked at least one aircraft model, which has had the capability to be 
refueled in flight.  For many of those years, two types of aircraft have had an aerial 
refueling capability; the AV-8B Harrier attack jet, and the CH-53E Super Stallion 
helicopter.  Although the MEU commander has U. S. Marine Corps (USMC) KC-130 
Hercules tanker aircraft under his operational control  (OPCON) when deployed, these 
aircraft are typically designated as “theater assets”, and not always immediately available 
because they are land-based aircraft.  It is not unusual for the KC-130 aircraft to be 
hundreds or sometimes thousands of miles from where the ARG is conducting training, 
contingency operations, or real world expeditionary operations.   
 
In the instances where the tankers have been utilized during missions, they have proven 
invaluable in making the mission a success by their ability to refuel other aircraft in 
flight, thereby extending the range of the refueled aircraft dramatically.  Such was the 
case in Operation Eastern Exit conducted in January of 1991, in which two CH-53E 
helicopters from the USS Guam, carrying a 60-man security force, were refueled twice 
en-route during a 466 nautical mile flight to evacuate the embassy in Mogadishu, 




Figure  1.  L Class Ship 




enough fuel to reach the embassy while the second provided enough fuel to begin the 
return flight to the ship.  By the time the operation had ended, over 280 Americans and 
foreign nationals from 30 different countries had been safely evacuated. 
1.1.1 Sea Power 21 
In 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) outlined his vision 
for tomorrow’s Navy.  He described a globally distributed force that delivers 
unprecedented firepower, defensive assurance, and operational independence to joint 
force commanders.  Three fundamental concepts make up the framework of Sea Power 
21 and the Navy’s dominance over our enemies in tomorrow’s dynamic environment:  
Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  The transformation will be implemented using a 
Global Concept of Operations to provide widely dispersed combat power by creating 




Figure  2.  Amphibious Ready Group 
Source:  USS Wasp Official US Navy website photograph archives. 
 
 
Key to this transformation is the creation of the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), 
consisting of an Amphibious Ready Group, Figure 2, augmented by surface combatants 
and submarines.  These groups will conduct missions in lesser threat environments.  As 
operational  concepts evolve,  and new systems  and tactics  are developed,  the Navy will 
leverage this increase in aviation capability.  The Global Concept of Operations calls for 
the creation of 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups, the same number as the newly designated 
Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), highlighting the importance of possessing a highly mobile, 
decisive strike capability, to provide presence and project power, if required, in the 
growing number of littoral, regional conflicts worldwide.  Admiral Clark goes on to 
write, “New platforms being developed for Expeditionary Strike Groups should be 




 1.1.2.1   Sea Strike 
When operational objectives cannot be achieved from over the horizon, it’s time for the 
Navy-Marine Corps team to move on land.  Using the combination of vertical and 
horizontal envelopment tactics, Marines will conduct a ship-to-objective maneuver by 
exploiting the maritime maneuver space made possible with the MV-22B tilt-rotor assault 
aircraft.  This will increase the reach of sea-based infantry five times the current medium 
lift rotary wing asset, the CH-46E.  Taking advantage of the MV-22B’s aerial refueling 
capability could increase this dominance even more (Clark 6). 
 1.1.2.2   Sea Shield 
One of the capabilities of Sea Shield is Sea and Littoral Control.  Control of the 
battlespace near the landmasses is absolutely essential to ensure quick access and the 
freedom of maneuver for joint maritime forces moving from the sea to objective areas, 
which may be on the beach or deep inland.  Arguably, aerial dominance is a function of 
aircraft sortie rate, on station time, combat radius, and threat. Because surface and 
subsurface threats include small, fast, though lightly armed surface combatants, as well as 
an array of floating, moored, and buried mines, vertical (aerial) movement of forces is the 
fastest, safest, and preferred method of moving assets ashore (Clark 7). 
 1.1.2.3   Sea Basing 
It can be said that Sea Basing is the Core of Sea Power 21.  Off our enemy’s coast, it puts 
to sea all the capabilities which are critical to operational success:  offensive and 
defensive firepower, command and control assets, maneuver forces, and probably most 
importantly, logistics.  By doing this, it reduces the vulnerability of forces and supplies 
ashore, protects the resources required to defend the forces by risk avoidance, and 
increases operational mobility, which is key to all maneuver warfare doctrine.  However 
to be fully successful, the aforementioned advantages must not come with the traditional 




1.1.2 The Expeditionary Strike Group Needs an Organic Tanker Asset 
 
The Expeditionary Strike Group needs an organic (ship-based, under the operational 
control of the MEU Commander) tanker asset that can provide aerial refueling support to 
receiver capable aircraft that make up the ESG today and the aircraft that will be 
embarked in the future.  USN Carrier Battle Groups (CBG) have enjoyed this capability 
since the Vietnam era using A-3, A-6, and S-3 carrier launched aircraft.  Even more 
recently, the U.S. Navy incorporated this important capability in its new F-18 E/F Super 
Hornet models, which are being introduced and serving in the fleet today. 
 
The Carrier Air Group (CAG) commander has long understood the importance of having 
tanker assets organically attached to support the myriad of missions of a carrier embarked 
air wing.  Not only does it give the CAG incredible tactical advantage and flexibility, it is 
also an important safety asset during blue water operations when aircraft in fuel-critical 
situations don’t have the option of diverting to a land-based airfield.  Organic tanker 
assets are a force multiplier for the wing commander; tankers increase the range and 
endurance of all carrier based, aerial refueling capable aircraft attached to Carrier Battle 
Group.   
1.1.3 An Organic Tanker Solution for the Expeditionary Strike Group 
Program Manager Air 261 (PMA-261), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and 
requirements personnel from Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command (MCCDC) have developed and defined the Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD) for the Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) to design, 
procure, and field an improved H-53 helicopter with greater lift capability and range.  
Much work has been done in the last two years and will culminate in the fall of 2005 with 
what is hoped will be a decision for official program initiation and approval for entry into 
the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase (PMA-261, 2004).  
  
This new production helicopter, properly designed and equipped, could fulfill the ESG 
requirement for an organic tanker asset.  If begun during the early phases of the 
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acquisition program, a conceptual design study of a tanker capability of the helicopter 
could be initiated to analyze the tactical benefits and design requirements.  Early 
inclusion of the requirements for a tanker capability would not have to be implemented in 
the initial design but could be part of a spiral development or a pre-planned product 
improvement (P3I).  Lessons learned could be leveraged from both the C-130 and the F-
18 communities on peculiar and specific equipment required to conduct tanker 
operations, as well as conducting trade studies exploring state-of-the-art systems, such as 
buddy-stores currently in use by many fixed wing platforms.   If successful, the HLR 
helicopter could become a multi-mission success story on par with the F/A-18 E/F 
program and provide the MEU commander capability and versatility that has not been 
enjoyed by forward deployed littoral forces before. 
1.2  USMC HEAVY LIFT REPLACEMENT PROGRAM 
The current Marine Corps heavy lift helicopter, the CH-53E, Figure 3, designed in the 
1960s and introduced in 1980 as an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to the CH-53D, 
has developed significant fatigue life, interoperability, maintenance supportability, and 
performance degradation concerns.   In order to support the Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) and the Joint Task Force (JTF) in the 21st century joint environment, an 
improved CH-53 is needed to maintain the Marine Corps’ heavy lift capability through 
the year 2025 and beyond.  This helicopter must provide improvements in operational 
capability, interoperability, reliability, and maintainability while reducing costs.  Analysis 
has concluded there are no non-material alternatives that will satisfy this requirement.  
The Heavy Lift Replacement program mission is to provide an air vehicle system, which 
will provide the very best solution for the Marine Corps’ vertical heavy-lift mission.  The 
HLR program is required to provide full system capability at Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) in FY15, with Full Operational Capability scheduled for FY21.  An 




    
Figure  3.  CH-53E Helicopter 
Source:  U.S. Navy Internet website photo archives, PO1 Jeffrey Truett 
 
1.2.1 The HLR Helicopter 
As the Nation’s premier expeditionary force, the Marine Corps is prepared to operate 
across the full spectrum of conflict, anywhere national interests require. Marine Corps 
Strategy 21 and the capstone concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) build 
upon and support future warfighting challenges depicted in Joint Vision 2020.  
Specifically, HLR supports the Joint Functional Concepts of Dominant Maneuver and 
Focused Logistics.  HLR supports Sea Power 21, specifically the MAGTF’s participation 
in Sea Strike and Sea Basing by enabling rapid, decisive operations and the early 
termination of conflict.  EMW establishes the basis for the organization, deployment, and 
employment of the Marine Corps to conduct maneuver warfare, and to provide the means 
or opportunities to make joint and multinational operations possible.  EMW operational 
concepts include Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Sustained Operations 





Figure  4.  HLR 3-View Drawing 
Source:  PMA-261 briefing to the FY04 Operational Advisory Group, Dec 2003 
 
Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM), a subset concept of OMFTS, enables forces to 
rapidly move directly from ships to objectives deep inland.   STOM facilitates the rapid, 
long-distance air movement of heavy equipment, cargo, and personnel that supports the 
evolving joint fundamental applications of agility, maneuverability, adaptability, and 
sustainability (PMA-261, 2003).   
 
1.2.2 The Acquisition Strategy 
An Acquisition Plan (AP) to address this shortfall, originally called CH-53E 
modernization, later known as CH-53X, and now referred to as the Heavy Lift 
Replacement (HLR), Figure 4, was initiated to design, procure, and field a new CH-53 
series helicopter.  The new aircraft will increase heavy lift capabilities in support of 
expeditionary and sea-based operations.  It is planned to incorporate systems and 
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technologies that will maximize interoperability and commonality with existing systems 
(PMA-261, 2003).   
 1.2.2.1   Source 
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC), as the sole designer, developer, and manufacturer 
for the CH-53E, is the only known source with the necessary skills, experience, facilities, 
and manufacturing techniques to meet the Government’s needs.  Moreover, award of any 
follow-on contracts to any other source likely would result in a substantial duplication of 
cost to the Government that will not be recovered through competition.  Therefore, the 
Government has determined that SAC is the only known firm, which possesses the 
necessary knowledge, experience, and technical data to provide and perform the required 
efforts (PMA-261, 2003). 
 1.2.2.2   Competition 
The HLR, which will be a major CH-53E engineering change that will result in a new 
CH-53 series helicopter, will be procured by other than full and open competition under 
title 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), only one responsible source, as implemented by FAR 6.302-
1(b)(1).  SAC is the only known qualified source that has the technical data; unique 
logistics support experience, and detailed knowledge/familiarity with the CH-53E to 
provide the required support within the required time frames.  Therefore, it is planned for 
contracts and provisioned orders to be awarded to SAC by other than full and open 
competition. 
 
The SDD contract will contain provisions for the procurement of interim spares and 
support necessary to the conduct of Contractor and Development Test and Evaluation, 
and early Operational Assessments.  Competition for spares and repair parts will be 
sought, promoted, and sustained through the development of documentation and 
provisions for the data rights necessary to the implementation of Performance Based 




1.2.3 Program Status 
As of November 2004, PMA-261 was moving forward toward Milestone B approval and 
continues to refine the requirements, conduct engineering trade studies, and evaluate risk 
reduction alternatives, in preparation for SDD contract award.  Upcoming milestones will 
include approval from the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) of the HLR 
ORD; a Systems Requirement Review and risk reduction contracting will follow. 
 
The PMA-261 systems engineering team completed the Technology Readiness 
Assessment and both a draft Air Vehicle Specification and Engine Specification have 
been completed.  Under a contract from PMA-261, Sikorsky is conducting a conceptual 
design study of the HLR, which will analyze the design compromises based on weight 
and performance estimates.  The program office has received the completed Structural 
Design Criteria and Tail Rotor Effectiveness studies.  These results, along with the results 
of the Avionics and Survivability studies are being evaluated and their findings are being 
used to refine the conceptual design of the vehicle. 
 
NAVAIR is currently working with the program office and SAC to ensure supportability 
requirements for the HLR are incorporated in the Air Vehicle Specification, Risk 
Reduction Statement of Work, and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (PMA-261, 




TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 HLR DEVELOPMENT 
The HLR air vehicle currently being proposed will be based on the existing USMC CH-
53E helicopter.  The basic aircraft system configuration will look similar to the current 
model but will incorporate many improved systems leveraging technological 
advancements made in rotary wing technology since the aircraft was designed in the mid 
1970s.  These may include, but are not limited to the following: 4th generation Main 
Rotor Blade, elastomeric rotor head with electric blade fold, split torque main gearbox 
and new nose gear boxes, composite empennage components, fly by wire Flight Control 
System, fully integrated glass cockpit with embedded navigation, communication and 
open architecture mission systems, and must demonstrate survivability on the 21st century 
battlefield (PMA-261, 2003). 
2.1.1 HLR Capabilities 
 
The HLR will be the only Marine Corps helicopter capable of effectively meeting the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force vertical heavy-lift assault transport requirements. It 
supports many crucial Direct Fire and Maneuver mission tasks by providing combat 
assault transport of heavy weapons, equipment and supplies as a primary function.  
Mission capabilities include: 
 
 Delivering combat assault transport of troops as a secondary function. 
 Supporting Forward Arming and Refueling Points as well as providing Rapid 
Ground Refueling. 
 Performing assault support for evacuation operations and other maritime 
special operations. 
 Augmenting local search and rescue assets and providing casualty evacuation 
from the field to suitable medical facilities or other aero medical aircraft. 
 Conducting tactical retrieval and recovery operations for downed aircraft, 
equipment and personnel.  
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 Providing airborne control and coordination for assault support operations. 
 Maintaining a self-defense capability against ground-to-air and air-to-air 
threats. 
 Retaining the capability to self-deploy and conducting extended range 
operations employing aerial refueling.  
 Presenting the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating 
bases and austere shore bases. 
 Maintaining the capability to operate at night, in adverse weather and under 
Instrument Meteorological Conditions at extended ranges (PMA-261, 2004).  
 
2.1.2 Physical Specifications 
 2.1.2.1   Transportability 
The ORD states the HLR Air Vehicle must be air transportable by C-5 Galaxy and C-17 
Globemaster III strategic-lift aircraft.  The transported air vehicle and any removed sub-
assembly shall meet the dimensional, towing, lifting, tie-down, clearance, access, 
pressurization, temperature, vibration, and load limit constraints of the specified method 
of transport (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.2.2   Shipboard Compatibility 
The logistics footprint for operations aboard L-class amphibious assault ships must be 
less than or equal to the current CH-53E requirement.  USMC logistics footprint will be 
based upon a 16-aircraft squadron acting as an element of a composite group or four 
acting as an element of a composite squadron.  The footprint must support 90 days 
Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL) exclusive of petroleum, oil, and 
lubricants and ordnance.  The HLR Air Vehicle AVCAL and Individual Material 
Requirement List and Support Equipment footprint shall fit within the existing shipboard 
logistics footprint of the CH-53E detachment on current L-class ships.  Aircraft size shall 
be similar to the current CH-53E dimensions and cannot exceed CH-53E flight-ready 





 2.1.2.3   Internal Cargo System 
The cargo system shall be able to accommodate a centerline row of standard USMC    
40” x 48” wooden pallets, Type 463L pallets as specified in MIL-P-27443 (pallet Types 
I, II and III), and standard 48” airdrop skid-boards identified in FMFM 7-47.  
Additionally, the internal cargo system shall be convertible to a flat floor condition 
without roller removal from the aircraft such that wheeled vehicle(s) may be rolled and 
personnel may walk on the resulting cargo floor (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.2.4   External Auxiliary Tanks 
The aircraft structure and fuel subsystem shall be able to utilize 650-gallon external fuel 
tanks.  The plumbing for these tanks shall be designed in such a way that the tanks are 
able to accept fuel via ground and aerial refueling (PMA-261, 2004).  
 2.1.2.5   Range Extension Tanks 
The aircraft structure and fuel subsystem shall be able to utilize internal range extension 
fuel tanks.  The plumbing for these tanks shall be designed in such a way that the tanks 
are able to accept fuel via ground and aerial refueling (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.2.6   Pressure Refueling 
The fuel subsystem shall allow the aircraft to be pressure refueled through the single 
point refueling adapter, the air-to-air refueling probe, and the Hover In Flight Refueling 
(HIFR) pressure refueling system (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.2.7   Air-to-Air Refueling Compatibility 
The aircraft shall be capable of receiving fuel in-flight and must be compatible with US 
and Allied tanker aircraft using a hose and drogue refueling system and associated 
procedures, airspeeds, and altitudes for air-to-air refueling (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.2.8   Air-to-Air Refueling Provision  
When missions dictate that receiving fuel in-flight is required for the mission, provisions 
shall be made for the installation of an air-to-air refueling probe kit. The kit shall be 
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delivered installed on each aircraft, and shall be considered as Special Equipment. 
Cockpit controls, indicators, and internal fuel lines shall be provided for an aerial 
pressure refueling system. When the refueling probe kit is used, tanks shall receive fuel 
simultaneously (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.2.9   Aerial Refueling Flow Rates  
With the main and auxiliary tanks receiving fuel simultaneously, applicable fuel system 
components shall be capable of functioning at an aerial refueling flow rate of 175 gallons 
per minute (gpm) (minimum) to 230 gpm (maximum) at a pressure not to exceed 55 psig 
at the probe nozzle (PMA-261, 2004). 
2.1.3  Performance Specifications 
 2.1.3.1   Speed 
The following shall be performed at a pressure altitude of 3000 feet and 91.5 Degrees 
Fahrenheit (° F). 
a. The HLR shall have a maximum continuous level-flight airspeed of not less than 
150 KTAS for the maximum internal load Takeoff Gross Weight (TOGW). 
 b. At the TOGW for the 110 nm SOA / External Lift mission with a 24,000 lbs / 56 
ft2 load, the HLR shall have a maximum continuous level flight airspeed of not 
less than 130 KTAS. 
 c. At the maximum external gross weight (GW), with a 29,200 lbs / 56 ft2 external 
load, the HLR shall have a maximum continuous level flight airspeed of not less 
than 110 KTAS (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.3.2   Maneuverability 
The operational flight envelope for gross weights up to 74,000 lbs and airspeeds up to 
130 KCAS shall permit defensive and obstacle avoidance maneuvers at angles of bank 
angles not less than 53 deg at sea level on a standard day and not less than 40 deg at 3000 
ft at 91.5° F (PMA-261, 2004). 
 2.1.3.3   Mission Performance 
The HLR helicopter will be capable of flying the six representative OMFTS/OEO/SOA 
mission profiles in support of MAGTF and JTF commanders. The aircraft must perform 
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the defined missions in adverse weather, at night, in low visibility, to unimproved 
surfaces, in moderate turbulence, under Instrument Flight Rules, Visual Flight Rules, 
Instrument Meteorological Conditions, Visual Meteorological Conditions, and Degraded 
Visual Environments unless otherwise excluded (PMA-261, 2004). 
2.2 HLR TANKER SPECIFICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
2.2.1 Discussion 
 
To provide the Marine Corps and Joint Force Commanders maximum flexibility, the 
HLR would be able to execute tanker missions with the installation of a mission kit, 
thereby not interfering with the helicopter’s primary or secondary missions.  The mission 
kit would consist of components that would enable the aircraft to be converted from the 
normal, cargo and personnel configuration, to conduct tanker operations.  This is 
critically important because the Marine Corps is a relatively small force, and will procure 
a limited number of heavy-lift assets.  Additionally, typically only four to six helicopters 
will be embarked with the ESG when forward deployed.  To convince decision makers 
that an HLR tanker makes sense, there must be no statistical degradation of the heavy lift 
mission, while at the same time enhancing the capabilities of the receiving aircraft, as it 
maximizes naval power projection through increased on-scene endurance and greater 
combat radius.  Enhanced on-station presence and improved combat radius compresses 
deployment and employment timelines, decreases sortie generation rates, reduces transit 
times, provides commanders more options and greater flexibility, and increases the 
operational effectiveness of every Sailor and Marine in the battlespace. 
2.2.2 Requirements 
In order for an aircraft to conduct tanker operations it must have the following 
characteristics.  It must have enough payload capacity to give fuel to one or more 
receiving aircraft.  Further, the method of transferring the fuel must be compatible with 
the way in which the receiver takes fuel in-flight.  The tanker must also be able to fly to 
some predetermined point, loiter long enough to conduct the fuel transfer, and return to 
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base (sea-base).  Finally, some, or its entire flight envelope must overlap that of the 
receiver’s airspeed range to allow the fuel transfer to take place. 
 2.2.2.1    Fuel Load 
Non-strategic tanker operations are generally conducted for one of two reasons:  to refuel 
aircraft in an emergency situation or to extend the combat radius and on-station time of 
the receiving aircraft.  At the present time, there are two types of carrier aircraft capable 
of serving as tankers in the Carrier Battle Group:  the S-3 and F-18 E/F.  Current ESG 
aerial refueling capable aircraft receive fuel from the KC-130 Hercules.  If the HLR is to 
make a viable tanker, then it must do one or both of the following:  be capable of giving 
fuel on the same order of magnitude as the aforementioned aircraft, or be capable to give 
enough fuel to receiver aircraft that it significantly extends their combat radius or loiter 
time.  Table 1 summarizes the fuel payload of the current tankers and what an HLR 
tanker might be capable of carrying.   
 
From Table 1, it can be seen the HLR tanker could give a comparable amount of fuel as 
is given today by the tactical tankers and could carry approximately 70% as much fuel in 
the cargo compartment alone as the KC-130, assuming a 2,500 gallon internal fuel tank 
(the CH-53E currently utilizes a mission kit that allows it to carry 2,400 gallons of fuel 
internally in support of Rapid Ground Refueling (RGR) missions).  In fact, some 
circumstances may result in the HLR tanker having as much, or more fuel available for 
transfer, than the KC-130, depending on mission configuration and the distances the KC-
130 must fly to reach the area of operations of the ESG. 
 2.2.2.2   Receiver Fuel Requirements 
Determining the receiver’s fuel requirement is difficult unless the specific mission is 
known.  Fuel requirements to extend sortie time while waiting to execute a Close Air 
Support (CAS) mission are different than ferrying the aircraft from one point to another.    
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Table 1:  Summary of Tanker Capabilities 
 
Maximum Fuel Payload (lbs)(2)(3) 











A-6 16,000 8,000 2,000 3,600 22,400 
S-3 13,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 15,000 
F-18 E/F 15,000 14,000 2,000 6,000 25,000 
KC-130 45,900 0 24,500 500 24,000 (5) 
HLR(4) 6700 8900 17,000 1,500 31,100 
Note:  (1) Does not include fuel required for tanker to fly to and from the refueling point. 
           (2) Payloads rounded to nearest 100 lbs. 
           (3) External and Store Payloads are for a typical mission configuration. 
           (4) Proposed capability 
           (5) Does not include internal fuel 
 
 
However, a good rule of thumb for tanker operations can be applied for our purposes of 
comparison.  Unless operational necessity dictates, the receiver aircraft should never be 
put into a “must plug” situation; in other words, if the aircraft is unable to receive fuel at 
the aerial refueling control point (ARCP), then it must be able to safely return to base or 
divert to another landing site where fuel is available. 
 
In order to comply with NATOPS requirements for fuel remaining after landing, and to 
allow some time to loiter at the refueling point and upon arrival for landing, the aircraft 
should have used no less than 40% of its takeoff fuel load prior to arriving at the ARCP. 
Table 2 is a summary of what each aircraft would take on from the tanker observing the 
limitations outlined.  Assuming the HLR fuel consumption rate is similar to the current 
CH-53E rate during transit, and using a two-hour tanker transit time, the HLR tanker will 
use about 7,000 lbs of fuel and will need another 2,500 for loitering at the ship and for  
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(40% of takeoff) 
CH-53E 15,500 9300 6200 
HLR 15,500 9300 6200 
MV-22B 9900 5900 3900 
AV-8B 7,300 4400 2900 
JSF 13,000 7800 5200 
Note:  All fuel weights rounded to nearest 100 lbs. 
  
NATOPS fuel requirements after landing.  Subtracting the 9,500 lbs fuel requirement 
from Table 1 leaves more than 21,000 lbs available to transfer to receiver aircraft.  
Aircraft typically operate in what is called a section, two aircraft conducting the same 
mission; each section consists of a flight lead and a wingman.  So to meet the receiver’s 
mission requirements, nominally the HLR tanker would have 10,500 lbs of fuel available 
for each aircraft. It should be noted that for mission planning purposes, the F-18E/F 
community plans about 2,500 lbs. of fuel per receiving aircraft when conducting its role 
as a mission tanker.   
 
Considering the results presented in Table 2 and comparing them to the results of the 
above discussion, it can be seen, in the scenario developed, the HLR tanker would have 
more than enough fuel to meet the receiver’s needs.  The 21,000 lbs total fuel available 
could refuel three CH-53E/HLR equivalents, or as many as five MV-22B aircraft.  Many 
scenarios are possible and each mission would be peculiar to the situation depending on a 




 2.2.2.3   HLR Flight Envelope 
For aerial tanking to be conducted, the HLR tanker must have a flight envelope that 
allows the receiver aircraft to fly at the same airspeeds, have acceptable flying qualities, 
and in the case of fixed wing aircraft and tilt rotor aircraft, have adequate stall margins.  
As stated in paragraph 2.1.3.1, sub-paragraph (a), the HLR shall have a maximum 
continuous level flight airspeed of not less than 150 KTAS for the maximum internal load 
TOGW.  The maximum continuous airspeed of the current CH-53E is 150 KIAS, 
although several years ago it was 170 KIAS.  The airspeed was reduced to increase 
airframe fatigue life.  As will be shown, 160 KIAS is the nominal, minimum continuous 
airspeed that will be required to conduct the tanker mission.  
 2.2.2.4   Receiver Flight Envelope 
There are four aircraft that could be capable of receiving in-flight fuel from the HLR 
tanker when it is introduced into the fleet, sometime after 2014.  The H-53 in its present 
version or the HLR version would certainly be capable given the fact the flight envelopes 
would be nearly identical.  The MV-22B, Figure 5, due to begin Operational Evaluation 
summer of 2005, and scheduled to begin deploying in 2008, has an aerial refueling probe. 
The AV-8B, Figure 6, which takes off vertically then flies like a jet, has a retractable 
aerial refueling probe.  Lastly, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which will eventually 
replace the AV-8B, will be embarked aboard the ARG and will also be capable of aerial 
refueling.  As with any proposed tanker-receiver combination, flight-testing must be 
conducted between the two aircraft and the fuel delivery system, which will be used, 
whether it is a probe-drogue system or a boom system.  Flight-testing should include at a 
minimum; aircraft handling characteristics, structural vibrations, engine response, field-
of-view and wake turbulence.    
 
 The results of a flight envelope comparison are presented as Figure 7.  As can be seen, 
the MV-22B has the least overlap with the proposed HLR Tanker envelope.  The MV-
22B published minimum airspeed with the aircraft in airplane mode is 136 KCAS.   At 





Figure 5.   MV-22B 







Figure 6.   AV-8B 











Figure 7.   ESG Aircraft Flight Envelope Comparison 
 
KIAS and stalls at approximately 110 KIAS.  Stall characteristics are benign and 
recoveries are affected with the simple application of power and reduction in aircraft 
attitude.  Currently the MV-22B NATOPS manual prohibits the aircraft from conducting 
aerial refueling operations in any mode other than airplane mode.  Being conservative, 
and using 140 kts as the minimum level flight airspeed for the MV-22B and a 160 kts 
maximum continuous airspeed for the HLR tanker, results in a 20 kts overlap in airspeed 
envelope between tanker and receiver.  Assuming a 155 kts aerial refueling airspeed, the 
tanker would be able to maintain a 5 kts buffer below its 160 kts maximum; maintainable 
since the tanker’s goal is to provide as stable a platform possible while the receiver works 
into the pre-contact, contact, and refueling positions.  At 155 kts, the MV-22B would still 
be 15 kts above the conservative 140 kts minimum level flight airspeed, approximately 
30 kts above the stall warning airspeed, and more than 40 kts above stall airspeed.  The 
other receiver aircraft would all have similar or greater margins. 
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2.3 HLR TANKER TECHNICAL PROPOSALS 
2.3.1 Aerial Refueling: A Brief History 
It has been more than 80 years since the idea of aerial refueling was first conceived.  In 
1921, a stunt pilot named Wesley May conducted a “refueling” demonstration for a group 
of curious onlookers in Long Beach, California.  Strapping a gas can to his back, May 
then walked out onto the wing tip of a Lincoln Standard biplane, stepped onto the wing 
skid of a Curtis JN-4 and poured five gallons of fuel into the JN-4’s tank.  This deed of 
daring was proclaimed the first air-to-air refueling. 
 
It was the military aviator who took the idea of aerial refueling from barnstorming 
gimmick to something of real value to the aviation community.  In 1923 a DH-4B aircraft 
was contacted by another DH-4B fifteen times, using nothing more than the force of 
gravity to receive oil, supplies, and 75 gallons of gasoline by means of a fuel hose.  The 
aircraft stayed airborne just over 37 hours.  Others, some of which ended in tragedy, 
followed this exchange.  But it was Fokker C-2 tri-motor monoplane called the Question 
Mark and two Douglas C-1 biplanes, which demonstrated the importance of mid-air 
refueling.  The Question Mark was fitted with additional tanks to receive fuel.  The two 
biplanes were configured with two 150-gallon fuel tanks and a 50-foot hose with a lead 
weight attached to the end.  The hose was then lowered through a small door in the 
bottom of the C-1’s fuselage.  For more than six days the Question Mark was kept aloft, 
during which time it received more than 40 tons of supplies, including 5,660 gallons of 
fuel, 245 gallons of oil, in addition to food, water, batteries, and other essentials. 
 
Despite the success demonstrated by pioneers early on, the progress of aerial refueling 
over the next couple of decades was limited.  When the United States entered World War 
II, fighter escorts conducting missions over Germany were forced to return to base while 
Luftwaffe aircraft attacked the un-escorted bombers.  In the Pacific, a proposed attack on 
Tokyo from Hawaii was scrubbed due to a lack of refueling crews and equipment even 
though some tests had proved successful during 1943 and 1944.   The war ended with 
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little or no progress in aerial refueling development.  However in 1946, all this would 
change with the activation of the Strategic Air Command at Bolling Air Force Base.   
 
Strategic Air Command planners realized very quickly if they were going to fulfill their 
global mission, in-flight refueling would have to become an integral part of the equation.  
The Boeing Airplane Company (BAC) was contracted to study transferring fuel between 
two B-29 Superfortresses by hose.  Using a crude but effect method of grappling hooks 
and “hauling lines”, the trials were ultimately successful.  This later evolved into the 
probe and drogue system used by fighters today.  This method did not work well with 
large aircraft and necessitated the design of an aerodynamically controlled, swiveling and 
telescoping arm known today as the flying boom (Tankers, 1999).   
 
Although the equipment used to transfer the fuel has undergone many evolutions and 
transformations, as well as countless variants of receiver jet aircraft, there have been only 
a handful of different platforms to assume the tanker mission.  That is changing today as 
the importance of tankers and the aerial refueling mission is becoming increasingly 
important.  The concept of forward peacetime basing is becoming increasingly unpopular 
and politically untenable.  Bases in Europe, specifically Germany and the United 
Kingdom are being closed or downsized.  Bases in the Philippines have already been 
closed for more than a decade now; not to mention the ever-increasing pressure to reduce 
our military presence in Japan.  Also, the aging fleet of KC-10 and KC-135 tankers of the 
U.S. Air Force’s, Air Mobility Command, is coming to the end of their designed service 
life.  All of this has spurred the development of commercially available Hose-Reel 
systems, wing pods, and Buddy-Store systems designed to be used on modified, 
commercially available aircraft.   The need has become so great that the U.S. Air Force 
attempted to lease modified 767’s from the Boeing Aircraft Company.  The proposal was 
for 100 tanker transports, but the agreement was terminated when it was found an Air 
Force contracting manager was giving special treatment to Boeing in return for a high-
level position within the company after her Air Force tenure.  However the aircraft 
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designated the KC-767, continued in production, and the first of four aircraft being built 
for the Italian Air Force was rolled out February 2005. 
2.3.2 Aerial Refueling Store 
To conduct the aerial refueling mission the HLR helicopter will require a way to transfer 
the fuel to the receiving aircraft.  This could be done in one of several ways; streaming a 
drogue from inside the aircraft, out of the ramp area, much the way the Navy MH-53E 
streams the equipment needed for the minesweeping mission.  Another method could be 
to use an aerial refueling wing pod, much like those used on large fixed wing aircraft.  
The pod would be mounted to the hard-point; outboard of the fuel sponson, at the current 
position the auxiliary fuel tank is mounted on the CH-53E.  The Sargent Fletcher 
company manufactures a wing pod today that could be adopted for use and meets all the 
specifications for fuel transfer rate, coupling compatibility, and has all the emergency 
provisions required for military use.  Detailed information on this pod is presented in 
Appendix B.  A similar but more suitable solution to the wing pod would be to make use 
of an aerial refueling “buddy-buddy” store, shown in Figure 8, used by tactical aircraft.  
The advantage of the buddy store is that unlike the wing pod, which is dry (does not 
contain a fuel cell), buddy store’s not only contain the hose-reel equipment needed to 
conduct the refueling evolution, they also hold transferable fuel, thereby making 
maximum use of the station.  Specifications for a buddy store in use today are included in 
Appendix C. 
2.3.3 Aerial Refueling Drogue 
The aerial refueling drogue, or paradrogue is used to provide an aerodynamically stable 
platform for the refueling coupling.   Drogues generally fall into two categories; high 
speed and low speed.  Low speed drogues, employed for helicopter aerial refueling, have 
a range of 100 –120 KIAS, while high-speed drogue ranges are anywhere from 200 – 325 
KIAS.  The size and design of the drogue are the major influences on what airspeed range 
the drogue will be used, and only modest amounts of engineering and testing would be 















Figure 8.   Aerial Refueling Store 
Source:  Naval Air Systems Command, Air-to-Air Refueling Manual, NAVAIR 00-80T-110, Oct 1992 
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“medium” speed drogue would be somewhat smaller than the low speed drogue and 
designed to be the same size or larger than the high speed drogue and projected to be 
used in the 150 – 170 kts range. 
2.3.4 Internal Fuel Cell 
The HLR tanker will make use of an internal fuselage tank, similar but smaller, than the 
3,592-gallon tank used by the KC-130, shown in Figure 9.  A cradle-mounted fuselage 
fuel tank of 2,500 gallons, the same volume used in paragraph 2.2.2.1 would have 
approximately a 17,000 lbs fuel capacity, well within the proposed specification 
identified in the HLR ORD.  The fuselage tank would be the primary source for transfer 
for in-flight refueling.  If additional fuel were needed, provisions could be made to 
transfer from the HLR sponsons fuel cells, into the fuselage tank, and then to the receiver 
aircraft.  Maximum flexibility would be achieved by being able to pump fuel from the 
fuselage tank to a fuel cross-feed manifold for consumption in the HLR engines for 
extended range refueling missions. 
 
As part of a refueling mission kit, the tank would be designed to be mounted on a 
portable cradle that can be easily installed or removed from the helicopter’s cabin on 
short notice with the use of equipment already available aboard the L class ships.  Using 
chains to tie-down fittings would secure the tank and cradle assembly to the floor.  
Ideally a cargo loading system would be designed to lock the system directly to the floor 
using a system of adaptor plates and locking side-rails.  The system would work almost 
identical to the system in the KC-130; located in the cabin, at or near the aircraft’s center 













Figure 9.   Internal Fuel Store as Installed in the KC-130 




 SECTION III 
TACTICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE HLR TANKER 
 
3.1 MEASURING THE IMPACT OF THE HLR TANKER 
The investment of resources, engineering analysis, trade studies, and test and evaluation 
time and energy must support an enhanced capability for the ESG and its aviation assets 
in order to justify designing, testing, and incorporating a tanking capability for the Heavy 
Lift Replacement.  The justification must come in the form of a measurable improvement 
in the operational capability of the ESG through its embarked aircraft.  If the receiver 
aircraft can fly farther, stay on station longer, and have a greater effect on shaping the 
battlefield because they were able to increase their range and endurance by receiving fuel 
during their mission, then it is a move forward in closing warfighting gaps and 
overcoming technical barriers in support of littoral warfare. 
 
The littoral environment is a complex warfighting theater of operations.  Disputed areas 
of the water are less clearly defined then those on land.  Littoral warfare encompasses the 
landward as well as the seaward portions of the battlespace.  Maritime history has shown 
time and again that littoral warfare is a more relevant application of naval combat power 
than that of blue water engagements. This requires a shift in strategic focus away from 
blue water warfighting against a naval superpower to conflicts of a regional nature where 
control of the coastline and its surrounding waters is the objective.  Obviously the Navy 
must do more than restate the strategic focus to execute littoral warfare; there must be 
something of a transformation.  This transformation begins with doctrine like Sea Power 
21, but it must include follow-through with changes to education and training, 
improvements in equipment, and adjustments to the support infrastructure.   
 
In November of 2003, General J.L. Jones, who was at the time the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, published Marine Corps Strategy 21.  In his vision he states the Marine 
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Corps,  “will enhance its strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility…” all 
of which will be enabled by an organic tanker asset for the Expeditionary Strike Group.  
3.1.1 Forcible Entry from the Sea 
The Navy and the Marine Corps provide this country with its primary capability to 
project and sustain power ashore in the face of armed opposition.  America’s reliance on 
this continuous forward presence and sustainable maritime power projection is integral to 
our foreign policy and is instrumental in convincing any potential enemy in the wisdom 
of keeping the peace.  To this end, effectiveness is then measured by how much power 
can be projected, how far can it be projected, and for how long it can be sustained.  
 3.1.1.1   Operational Reach 
To understand the implications of how an organic tanker asset can greatly enhance the 
capabilities of receiver aircraft, one has only to look at a recent historical example. When 
the national authority made the decision to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
in the fall of 2001, the United States had little or no support from the other nations in the 
region.  Although these countries were not overtly hostile to the United States, there was 
not open support of our mission due to the political climate and religious affiliations of 
the populace.  America had no forward base in the region to build up combat power or to 
operate from in order to get a foothold in the theatre, much less to conduct combat 
operations.  Even though Afghanistan is 300 miles from the Arabian Sea, the closest 
avenue of approach from the ocean, the Navy and Marine Corps was tasked to establish a 
foothold in Afghanistan to facilitate the build up of heavier-armed, follow-on forces.  
Diplomatic compromises and political pressure resulted in Pakistan eventually allowing 
the United States use of its coastal waters and over-flight of its borders but would not 
allow aircraft to land to refuel, or rearm during the assault.  Because of the distances 
involved, the helicopters could not conduct the assigned mission without the use of 
tankers to conduct aerial refueling which would be needed to reach the objective area in 
Southern Afghanistan.  Figure 10 shows the un-refueled range and the range with one 
refueling evolution with the CH-53E helicopter, the aircraft that eventually executed the 













Figure 10.  Arabian Sea 
Un-refueled Combat Radius vs. Refueled Combat Radius (Actual Mission) 
Source:  Centennial World Atlas, Hammond Incorporated, Maplewood New Jersey, 1999. 
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In November of 2001, six CH-53E helicopters flew almost 400 miles, conducting a night 
aerial refueling evolution with KC-130 aircraft en-route, and established Camp Rhino, 
the first forward operating base established during Operation Swift Freedom.  The 
objective was an airstrip approximately 50 miles south of Kandahar in Southern Iraq, and 
within hours of the helicopters landing, the airfield was secure and KC-130 aircraft were 
landing non-stop with troops and equipment until dawn.  The mission was the result of 
hundreds of hours of briefs, planning, and rehearsals and was only accomplished because 
of the increased range the United States was able to project military power ashore.  The 
KC-130 aircraft were land based and required diplomacy and negotiation to allow their 
basing in close enough proximity to be able to fly the long flight to the refueling point.  
These negotiations and political maneuverings would not have been required if the 
tankers were ship-based and organically attached. 
 3.1.1.2   Tactical Flexibility 
The previous scenario was an historic example of tanker aircraft extending the 
operational reach of the receiver aircraft.  Beyond that, these aircraft enabled the Marines 
to establish a forward operating base, enabling the rapid build up of combat power in 
theatre.  This one mission was the basis for the coalition’s foothold into Afghanistan and 
the eventual defeat of the Taliban regime.  Tactical flexibility, like operational reach 
provides geographic combat commanders with scalable, interoperable forces that have 
the ability to shape the regional environment, and respond quickly to a complex spectrum 
of crisis and conflicts to prosecute forcible entry operations. 
 
In the following mock scenario, diplomatic options are running out in negotiations 
between the United States and North Korea due to the county’s recent buildup of forces 
on the South Korean border.  The ESG has taken up station in the Sea of Japan and is  
tasked to conduct EMW lift missions including the insertion of a rapid response force, 
follow-on response force, and surge response force to reinforce South Korean positions.  
The ESG has also been ordered to prepare to reinforce any success of coalition land 
forces that are pushing North Korean forces back north of the border.    The MV-22B and 
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the HLR with tanker mission kits are embarked with the ESG and is maintaining a 250-
mile standoff from the shoreline due to North Korea’s naval coastal defenses and an 
underwater mine threat.  In the event of mission execution, carrier based tactical aircraft 
have been assigned to neutralize all immobile surface-to-air missile threats, and only 
short-range, man portable, shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles will remain. 
 
The map in Figure 11 shows what the range of the MV-22B would be with a 24-man 
insertion force with and without aerial refueling.  Without aerial refueling, the MV-22B 
would only be able to conduct limited operations along the eastern coastline of the 
peninsula.  Depending on the exact location of the ship, winds, and other factors, the 
MV-22B would have approximately a 275-mile combat radius.  By conducting just one 
aerial refueling evolution on the ingress, the MV-22B would now increase its combat 
radius by approximately 175 miles.  With a full load of fuel, just prior to crossing the 
shoreline, the aircraft can now conduct the insertion mission almost anywhere on the 
peninsula and still return to the ship without having to refuel again, avoiding the must 
tank situation to make it back to the ship.  This same scenario could be used to highlight 
the advantage of the organic tanker with any of the embarked aircraft.  Table 3 
summarizes the increase in combat radius that could be gained by the receiver aircraft. 
 









Increase in Combat 
Radius (refueled). 
(Nautical miles) 
Increase in Combat 
Radius (refueled). 
(%) 
CH-53E 15,500 225 125 56% 
HLR 15,500 225 125 56% 
MV-22B 9850 275 175 64% 
AV-8B 7750 90 50 56% 
JSF 15,000 600 325 54% 
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Figure 11.  Sea of Japan 
Un-refueled Combat Strike Area v. Refueled Combat Strike Area of MV-22B 
(Scenario based) 






4.1 THE WAY FORWARD 
An organic rotary-wing tanker asset embarked on Expeditionary Strike Group, L-class 
ships is a technical solution that directly supports the vision of Sea Power 21.  By 
expanding ship-to-objective maneuver it exploits the maritime maneuver space by 
dramatically increasing the operational reach of the MV-22B Osprey and the AV-8B 
Harrier, providing the offensive punch that is at the heart of the Sea Strike concept.  The 
increased range and tactical flexibility the HLR tanker will give to the MV-22B and the 
HLR helicopter enhances operational mobility, the cornerstone of Sea Basing, by 
leveraging the extended ranges and on-station times of receiver aircraft.  Making more of 
the enemy’s infrastructure vulnerable while making an even greater obstacle of the sea to 
our enemies will support operational Maneuver from the Sea.  Tactical strike aircraft 
(AV-8B, JSF) and assault aircraft (HLR, MV-22B) that can fly farther and stay aloft 
longer allow the Strike Group Commander to apply precise fire power over a larger area 
rather than massing assets on a small defensible area.  Where conflict has not yet begun, 
the enhanced operational reach provided by the HLR tanker will allow the clandestine 
insertion of advance parties of Special Operations Forces and Marines sooner, and deeper 
into the enemies lands to gather intelligence.  On scene endurance will allow the ESG to 
form a defensive shield that will protect an allied nation from a threatening neighbor 
while the international community has a chance to negotiate or begin a buildup of forces. 
 
Incorporating an aerial tanker capability into the HLR program now, early in the 
development stage, provides an opportunity to achieve an enormous benefit with modest 
developmental costs little time expenditure. Much of the tanker-receiver compatibility 
testing outlined in paragraph 2.2.2.4 could be conducted now with the current version of 
the CH-53E and receiver aircraft in service today, including the MV-22B.   
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Achieving the above will take transformation; a shift from thinking that we will be alone, 
fighting a large, immobile force, at sea - to a conflict fought as a coalition, with a smaller, 
more mobile enemy, whose boundaries are not found on a map.  Admiral Clark, the 
former Navy CNO wrote, “Sea Power 21 commits our Navy to developing innovative 
concepts, technologies, and organizational initiatives.”  Developing an HLR tanker 



























5.1 ACTIONABLE TASKS 
In order for the HLR tanker capability to be incorporated into the HLR acquisition 
program, the requirement must be defined, tasking assigned, and engineering and 
programmatic issues resolved.  The following recommendations outline a place to start, 
near-term, and are presented to illustrate the scope of development and modest expense 
required to evaluate and analyze this increased capability for Marine Aviation.   
5.1.1 Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
The mission of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) is to 
develop Marine Corps warfighting concepts and to determine the associated capabilities 
in the areas of doctrine, organization, training and education, and equipment to enable the 
Marine Corps to field combat-ready forces, and to support other major processes of the 
Combat Development System.  Since the HLR Operational Requirements Document was 
recently signed in January 2005, MCCDC would only need to write an amended ORD 
that would include a tanker capability in the form of a mission kit.  The Marine Corps 
Warfighting Lab (MCWL), which is part of MCCDC, is tasked to improve current and 
future naval expeditionary warfare capabilities and is structured such that it can conduct 
experimentation and Science and Technology initiatives.  The war-gaming division of 
MCWL needs to quantify the benefits of the HLR tanker capability and present these 
findings to Marine Corps leadership. 
5.1.2 Program Manager Air 261 
With a defined need statement from MCCDC, PMA-261, conduct engineering liaison 
with industry and determine the technical requirements for the inclusion of an aerial 
refueling tanker capability mission kit.  Execute analysis in such time as to be able to 
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